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The Role of Independent Directors in
Corporate Governance
William C Greenough * and Peter C C/apman**
Public discussion of corporate governance and the role of independent direc-
tors in recent years has begun to polarize over the extent to which government
should interject itself.' Do those who favor government intervention into the
process of corporate governance really seek to control one of the great levers of
power in our society? Or do they have much more modest goals of forcing corpo-
rations to be more "responsive" to various social needs as defined by critics of
American business? And are those who align themselves on the side of business
correct when they deny that there have been problems in the governance of cor-
porations so significant and pervasive as to justify major changes? Is there per-
haps a third group, those who believe that the economic problems of the coming
decades are so challenging that changes do need to be made in the forms of
corporate governance, but that these changes should be accomplished in the pri-
vate sector and insofar as possible without government mandate?
Our purpose is to analyze the role of independent directors in corporate
governance and to suggest directions that the law and prevailing practice might
take. We will generally align ourselves with the third group above. Critical ex-
amination of governance issues should not be limited to business, although this
article is so limited. It would be useful to apply such analysis to all institutions,
including the independent sector consisting of educational institutions, hospitals,
nonprofit organizations, and the other structures so fascinating to deTocqueville
2
by which we accomplish much work in America. And it should apply especially
to government, which in recent years has presumed to tell business just how to
run itself while managing its own affairs with somewhat limited success. The
comparison with other institutions shows the strength of the private sector by
virtue of its dispersing decisionmaking functions among thousands of diverse en-
tities; it enables us to conclude that business has emerged from the confrontation
of the 1960's and 1970's with greater capacity for innovation in the 1980's than
has government.
I. Changes in the Role of Independent Directors
There have been important writings and vigorous debates on the role of
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Fund. A.B., Indiana University, 1935; A.M., Harvard University, 1938; Ph.D, Harvard University, 1949;
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- Senior Vice-President and Associate General Counsel, Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association
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1 See, e.g., Sloate, Outside Corporate Directors:. Will Increasing Libiliy Send Them Running Out of Board
Rooms?, 31 Bus. LAW. 1295 (1976); Moss, The Crisis of Corporate Accountability. A Legislator's View, 3J. CORP.
L. 251 (1978); Wakeling, A Proposal to Limit the Civil Liability of Corporate Directors and OAfers, 1976 INS. L.J.
608.
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corporations and the responsibilities of directors at various times in our history,
particularly around 19003 and in the 1930's. 4 But the period beginning in the
late 1960's produced an important change of direction by focusing on the inter-
nal workings of corporations, by questioning the corporate decisionmaking pro-
cess, and by challenging the manner for selecting corporate and board
leadership.5 This change, like other changes in our society, has led to increasing
participation by the legal profession.
The movements of the 1960's were concerned with issues not immediately
perceived to involve "corporate governance," a phrase not even in use at that
time.6 These concerns included civil rights, the "war against poverty," and the
Vietnam war. With articulate pressing of these issues on college campuses, many
major institutions soon came under challenge, including the American corporate
sector in general and particular target companies that found themselves the
center of attention.
If many of these target companies, and American business generally, were
initially slow to respond effectively to the issues, the events of the 1970's brought
even greater shock. Before the concerns of the 1960's had faded, new issues were
added: consumerism, environmentalism, Watergate, and disclosures of interna-
tional corporate bribery. Highly publicized corporate financial scandals such as
Equity Funding and messy collapses such as Penn Central helped tarnish the
corporate image.
The public's perception of American business, confirmed in all public opin-
ion polls, was low and dropping.7 And the initial reaction of most of business to
the surfacing problems was negative, aloof and ineffective. There was little at-
tempt to confront those critics who misconceived or distorted the role of Ameri-
can business, or to examine the critics' proposals to see whether any were worth
implementing. The critics made the most of the opportunity, and the public's
perception of business deteriorated even further.
As a result, corporate leadership carried not public approval but a mark of
suspicion and distrust. The lack of appropriate response was well illustrated by
what occurred during preparation of the 1980 Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) staff study into corporate governance.8 The SEC examined the entire
range of corporate governance issues and invited participation from the broadest
spectrum possible. The weight of testimony was on the side of critics of Ameri-
3 See, e.g., Dwight, Liabilitp of Corporate Directors, 17 YALE L.J. 33 (1907); Jessup, Are Directors of Corpora-
tions Held to a Suftient Accountabili?, 3 N.Y. BENCH & B. 23 (1905); Williams, Responsibility of Directors of
Corporations for Wrongful.Acts, 47 AM. L. REc. 317 (1899).
4 See, e.g., Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932);
Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Dodd, Is Efective Enforce-
ment of the Fiducia' Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 194 (1935); Douglas, Directors
Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305 (1934); LaFollette, Management, Too, Must Be Responsible, I
NAT'L L. GUILD Q. 3 (1937).
5 See, e.g., Blumberg, ReJlections on Proposalsfor Corporate Reform Through Change in the Composition of the
Board of Directors: "Special Interest" or "Public" Directors, 53 B.U.L. REV. 547 (1973); Moscow, The Independent
Director, 28 Bus. LAW. 9 (1972).
6 The phrase "corporate governance" came into vogue in the 1970's. It was first used in a judicial
opinion in Wilson v. Commissioner, 560 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1977).
7 For example, in mid-1975 "Big Business" had a 61% negative confidence rating. Business in gen-
eral had a 48% negative rating. These negative ratings were strongest among young educated persons. G.
GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1972-1977, at 529 (1978).
8 SEC, REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY (Comm. Print 1980) (submitted to the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)).
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can business; few corporate proponents came forward to present contrary views.9
As a result, it was difficult for the SEC to sort out the good from the bad ideas.
There was little articulate expression of the considerable steps already taken by
American business to improve corporate governance.' 0
In any case, the events of the 1960's and 1970's have created a healthy cli-
mate for addressing and solving the problems of corporate governance. A good
deal of progress has already been made and the trends are all in the right direc-
tion.
The current emerging role of independent directors has developed from
three interrelated forces: (1) court decisions; (2) the role of the SEC; and (3)
directors' own perceptions of their role. Although the last force may be the most
important and lasting, the first two are critical in affecting the third.
A. Court Decisions
Although there have been a number of important state law decisions per-
taining to directors' legal responsibilities, I' it is the federal court decisions inter-
preting the federal securities laws that have had the greatest influence on the way
directors view their role and the risks attendant upon that role. Early federal
cases in this development were Escoll v. BarChris Construction Corp. 12 and Gould v.
American Hawaiian Steamship Co. t The significance of these cases is that directors
not themselves guilty of deliberate misconduct were nevertheless held liable for
failing to perform duties conscientiously. In BarChrs, a director accepted with-
out inquiry factual statements in a prospectus. 14 In Gould, a director argued un-
successfully that his failure to read a document containing a false statement
absolved him of liability.' 5 It is a mark of progress how unreal such a defense
seems to us.
B. The Securties and Exchange Commission
Not surprisingly, the SEC began to extend the judicial authorities imposing
the duty of affirmative oversight as part of independent directors' responsibilities.
In Report of Sterling Home Co p. Lnvestigation,t6 the Commission reviewed the con-
duct of two independent directors of a corporation which had engaged in securi-
ties laws violations. Although these directors had not been part of the illegal
scheme, the SEC criticized them for "not play[ing] a significant role in the direc-
tion of a company's affairs," and declared: 'JTJhis case illustrates a situation
where these directors, in the opinion of the Commission, did not provide the
shareholders with any significant protection in fact, nor did their presence on the
Board have the impact upon the company's operations which shareholders and
9 See general45 SEC, Record of Proceedings, id
10 Id
II See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963); Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.S.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
12 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
13 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated
the district court's judgment on certain issues but upheld the standard and determination of the outside
director's liability. Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
14 283 F. Supp. at 688.
15 351 F. Supp. at 865.
16 [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 80,219.
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others might reasonably have expected."1 7
C. Directors' Se/f-Perceptions of Role
Along with judicial authorities and the SEC came an increasing number of
knowledgeable commentators who began to speak out responsibly on these issues.
SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, testifying in 1976 before a Senate Committee,
observed:
Until fairly recently, certain patterns were clearly discernible in many publicly held
corporations: the directors were the personal choices of the chief executive officers;
some directors frequently regarded directorships as pelts to be displayed proudly on
their belts; directors frequently regarded board memberships as sinecures, honors,
pleasant experiences and paid scant heed to the responsibilities that attended such
office. 
18
The SEC's emphasis on corporate governance during the Chairmanship of Har-
old Williams t9 continued the effort already established in the prior administra-
tion.
Under the thrust of these forces, many constructive changes began to occur
starting with directors' own perceptions. Commissioner Sommer in his testimony
also stated: "The situation is changing dramatically and drastically. I would
suggest that persons asked to join boards of publicly held companies now do so
only after reflecting carefully upon the responsibilities they assume and the avail-
ability of time to perform adequately . . 0
II. The Current Role of Independent Directors
In light of these legal developments and changed perceptions, what can (and
should) independent directors do when asked to serve? What benefits will accrue
to particular corporations and society generally if they perform such roles? Is
there inherent conflict between what society wants from independent directors
and the ultimate success of the corporations they serve? To analyze the in-
dependent director's role it is necessary to identify (1) the major responsibilities of
all directors,2 ' and (2) the independent director's relationship to broader societal
objectives-for example, "responsiveness," integrity, democracy, and productiv-
ity.
Four responsibilities of all directors of corporations stand out: (1) authoriz-
ing major corporate actions; (2) delegating board authority; (3) monitoring cor-
porate conduct; and (4) advising and counseling top management.
Authorizing. The first of these corporate functions, from a strictly legal and
functional point of view, is the most basic-yet one where the distinction be-
tween independent and inside directors may appear least significant. Corporate
17 Id In this regard, see also the Commission's complaint in SEC v. Penn Central Co. [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 94,527.
18 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PUB. No. 229, DUTIES AND REsPONSIBILrIEs OF OUTSIDE DIREC-
TORS 64-65 (1977).
19 See, e.g., Williams, Introdution--Symposium on Corporate Governance, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1979); Wil-
liams, Corporate Accountabiliy and the Lawyer's Role, 34 Bus. LAW. 7 (1978).
20 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 18, at 67.
21 A useful review of the responsibilities of corporate directors is available in Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law, ABA, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 5 (1976).
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practice in the United States has developed reasonably well-understood princi-
ples as to what types of action must be authorized by the board. Almost all
medium sized and large corporations have counsel able to assure compliance
with state corporate laws. This aspect of corporate authority appears little
abused.
One could conclude that inside directors can perform this function at least
as well as independent directors. Inside people have a better working knowledge
of the company's activities and are better able to recognize actions important
enough for board level consideration. Yet there are notable exceptions, particu-
larly where corporate decisions directly affect the jobs and authority of current
management. For example, tender offers present the critical question of whether
the takeover attempt is in the best interests of the target company and its share-
holders. In a number of highly publicized instances,2 2 serious questions have
developed as to whether directors, in opposing one suitor or favoring another,
have acted in the corporation's best interests or have acted to preserve their own
positions. A board with a fair degree of independence from inside management
can make a more objective decision.
Delegating. Most large corporations have committees authorized to act for
the board in defined areas. Only a few years ago independence on auditing and
nominating committees was considered good but unusual. Now, accepted prac-
tice requires that these committees be largely, if not totally, independent. Such
committees also may function in the area of management compensation incen-
tives.
Monitoring. Although monitoring relates to the corporation's overall produc-
tive performance, its control aspects are also crucial. The board and its commit-
tees must serve as a conscience to prevent the kind of overzealous activity in
specific cases that led corporate America into disrepute. Independence on a
board promotes a code of corporate conduct which comes down on the side of
honesty in difficult situations.
Advising and Counseling. This is ultimately what the board is all about. A
strong chief executive officer surrounded by able top officers, working with a sup-
portive but demanding and attentive board-perhaps this is an accurate defini-
tion of good corporate governance.
We now turn to independent directors' role in meeting the objectives of the
corporation and of society at large, particularly with reference to corporate ac-
countability, integrity, diversity, compensation, and productivity.
Accountability. Many individuals and groups interested in corporate govern-
ance in recent years have declared their goals to be "accountability" and "re-
sponsiveness." These are a new type of demand, and contrast interestingly with
American history. The empire builders of the 19th century---Carnegie, Rockefel-
ler, Harriman, Stanford-and tens of thousands of miners, farmers, and business-
men fanned out across a vast, seemingly limitless new continent. Their concern
was first in surviving and then in producing and moving products to the market.
They gave little attention to the environment, civil rights, safety, the rights of
22 These instances have often led to litigation. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp.
1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
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workers, consumers or customers, or social needs. Questions of fairness in the
society had not really surfaced.
The demands of the 1970's and 1980's for greater corporate "responsiveness"
have to do with each of these items. And a major function for independent direc-
tors is to monitor the progress of the companies they serve in each of these areas.
They are not the sole monitor-government, the "marketplace," and consumer
and civil rights activists also monitor. But the independent director is in a posi-
tion both to monitor and to direct the company along effective lines.
A number of companies have appointed committees (variously called social
policy committees, public affairs committees, etc.) to increase their activities in
the area of social responsibility.23 These committees are frequently composed
solely of outside board members who are charged with bringing to the attention
of the board and management such concerns as environmental protection, fair
employment practices, establishment of plants in such controversial countries as
South Africa, and bribery. This useful development provides a forum for consid-
ering such matters upon the request of outsiders and a window through which
the corporation's managers can evaluate the broad social forces impinging on the
corporation. This element in corporate governance was not present until the last
half dozen years.
Integrity. Much of the discussion about corporate governance concerns
bribes, self-dealing, improper use of inside information, antitrust violations, and
similar transgressions. These are areas in which a corporation's independent di-
rectors can be especially useful in their monitoring and guidance capacities. In-
dependent directors' ability to support management's decision not to pursue
markets where unacceptable practices are maintained can be crucial in corporate
decisions. Those who operate in certain international markets must determine
the level to which American ideals may be bent in order to achieve the useful
goals of selling goods and providing jobs.
A primary mechanism by which outside directors perform their monitoring
respdnsibility is the audit committee. 24 In 1977 the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) began requiring all listed companies to have an audit committee com-
posed of outside directors.25 At the time this requirement was established most
listed companies already had such committees, while others had to add them and
a few had to add enough outside directors for the first time to fill such commit-
tees. This salutary development reveals the private sector's ability to accomplish
ends that otherwise would require government intervention. This use of in-
dependent directors should be extended to such areas as compensation and nomi-
nation for board memberships.
In late 1980 the NYSE staff reviewed the most recent proxy statements of
some 1,420 listed companies regarding the prevalence of audit, compensation,
and nominating committees. The results were as follows:
In compliance with the Exchange's Audit Committee Policy, all 1,420 compa-
nies had Audit Committees composed exclusively of independent directors.
23 See Lovdal, Bauer, & Treverton, Public Responsibility Committees ofthe Board, HARV. Bus. REv., May-
June, 1977, at 40.
24 See generally Greene, Audit Committee-A Measured Contribution to Corporate Governance: A Realistic Ap-
praisal of its Objectives and Functions, 34 Bus. LAw. 1229 (1979).
25 New York Stock Exchange Rule 2495H.
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1,195 of the 1,420 companies included in the review--84%--had voluntarily es-
tablished Compensation Committees. More than 1,100 had at least a majority of
independent directors, and about 800 were entirely composed of independent direc-
tors.
The number of listed companies that had established Nominating Committees
had also increased substantially since 1978, although the Nominating Committee
concept remains an untried innovation for many. A total of 528 out of 1,420-37%--
had such committees. More than 90% of them had independent director majorities,
and about half were composed entirely of independent directors.2
6
Diversio. During the last ten years America's corporations have sought di-
rectors from a much larger pool of talent. The number of women and minorities
serving on boards has significantly increased. 2 7 Greater effort has been made to
reach out beyond "establishment business types" into the ranks of consumers,
labor, academics, and government. One of the extensive discussions of the 1980's
regarding corporate governance will concern "representation" on boards. 28 Con-
sumers, shareholders, workers, union leaders, environmentalists, and others have
long demanded that boards include "representatives" of their interests. The
placing of the Rev. Leon Sullivan on the General Motors board some years ago
brought to the board of a great American corporation an exceedingly able black
who "represented" a number of interests and backgrounds not previously repre-
sented. The appointment of Douglas Fraser, head of the United Auto Workers,
to the board of Chrysler Corporation during its initial governmental rescue was
an act of "representation" quite different from that of the Rev. Sullivan. The
controversial appointment of Mr. Fraser raises questions regarding fiduciary re-
sponsibilities and the interests both of consumers who want to purchase cars at
the lowest possible price and of taxpayers whose own businesses might well profit
from public subsidy.
29
Suggestions are sometimes made for "achieving greater democracy" on
boards by competitive voting for corporate directors. 30 This probably will occur
first in mutual savings institutions. A number of legislative proposals requiring
such elections have already been introduced in savings bank states,3 1 but none
seems close to passage. It can be hoped that corporations will experiment with
nominations of more than a single candidate for at least some board member-
ships.
A word of caution should be added. There are those who seek to establish
an adversary relationship between the board and management. Their demands
26 Remarks by William M. Batten, Chairman, New York Stock Exchange, Inc., to the University of
California Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego, California (Jan. 23, 1981).
27 In 1977 there were 400 female directors of major American corporations-up from only a handful
in 1970. Bus. WEEK, Jan. 10, 1977, at 49. According to the latest Korn/Ferry International study, the
trend toward increased women and minorities may have slowed during the past year, although the num-
bers are still much higher than in the past. Korn/Ferry International, Board of Directors, Eighth Annual
Study (1981).
28 For a discussion of the role and responsibilities of "Special Interest Directors" see 35 THE RECORD
26 (1980).
29 Mr. Fraser's Chrysler directorship seems more an isolated situation than a trendsetter. There is
little indication of interest in American corporate governance to adopt recommendations for substantial
labor representation on boards such as Germany's codetermination. See Weideman, Codeteraination by
Wrkers ih German Enterprises, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 79 (1980); Britain's Bullock Report, Report of the Committee
of Inquig, on Industriali Democraq, Cmnd. 6706 (1977).
30 Korn/Ferry International, Board of Directors, Seventh Annual Study (Feb. 1980).
31 See SEC, REPORT ON CORPORATE AccourABILTY 37, 208-10 (Comm. Print 1980).
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for "representative" board members may be motivated by this desire. To acqui-
esce in these demands would merely extend "special interest group" pressuring,
now so worrisome in government, into the board room. Vigorous discussion,
even tension, is to be sought after; continual contention is not.
Under the heading of "diversity" one might also discuss how to govern with
zest. In spite of the changes that have occurred, few boards reach nearly their
potential in being useful to the corporation. Major reasons for this are the man-
ner of recruiting board members, the long tenure provided most board members,
and the stultifying atmosphere of most board meetings.
Effective corporate governance requires a creative, zestful, and dynamic
board. A few changes in board organization could increase the vigor of most
boards. Corporate boards should seriously consider limiting participation on the
board to a given number of terms, and of course, to a given age.32 Most corpora-
tions presently have some kind of a retirement age for board members and a few
have a limitation on terms.33 Some provide for turnover and rotation of board
members in the event individuals leave the activity which originally brought
them to the board and made them knowledgeable in its affairs. 3 4 But few indeed
have clear-cut ways to achieve vigorous turnover other than a retirement age.
Every corporation should consider just what it needs in the way of board
members-how much it needs technical knowledge, experience, and corporate
memory, and how much it needs youthful contact with what is transpiring in
research, marketing, international trade, or any other activity in which the cor-
poration engages. Then it should consider how to achieve enough turnover to
develop new ideas and to replace persons who have lost their creativity or inter-
est.
Compensation. It is likely that the public, government, stockholders, and
workers will take greater interest during the 1980's in compensation of top of-
ficers of American business. Increasingly, shareholders are voting perceptively on
management proposals that SEC rules35 require to be in the proxy statements.
Many institutional investors now look carefully at stock option, pension, bonus,
and other compensation plans for reasonableness and inducements for good man-
agement. It seems predictable that long-term, highly remunerative contracts will
receive particular scrutiny, especially by shareholders. This suggests that all such
contracts should be negotiated and controlled by an outside nominating or com-
pensation committee of the board.
36
Productivity. Amazingly, the undiscussed question in governance of Ameri-
can corporations concerns the corporation's ability to perform its main function.
One rarely hears such words as productivity, competitiveness, creativity, or other
words that describe what the successful corporation is all about.
37
32 Accord, Lewis, Choosing and Using Outside Directors, HARV. Bus. REv., July-Aug., 1974, at 70. Excep-
tions would have to be made for continuing the chief executive officer on the board. There also should be
flexibility for continued service of the "father" of a business, for a person whose "corporate memory" is
useful in board deliberations, or for one whose extraordinary talents should remove him or her from the
operation of a term and rotation requirement.
33 Korn/Ferry International, Board of Directors, Seventh Annual Study (Feb. 1980).
34 Id
35 Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1980).
36 For a discussion of procedures at a large public corporation in the public eye, see Murphy, The G.A
Nominating Committee: Its Role in Corporate Governance, DIRECTORSHIP, Oct. 1978.
37 Not once does the 782-page SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE AccOUNTABILITY use any of
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Perhaps this is the problem. Perhaps our preoccupation with other goals has
allowed America to lose its competitive edge. America's savings rate is the lowest
of any of the Western countries. 38 Expenditures for research and development
badly lag behind those of our trading partners. 39 We have lost much of the elec-
tronics market. 40 It is not beyond possibility that we can lose our automobile
industry, an unthinkable prospect only a few years ago.
The primary task in running American corporations is to make them dy-
namic and productive. Unless the corporation itself is viable, all other govern-
ance objectives-for example, greater responsiveness to environmental concerns,
civil rights, safety, and social needs-will avail little. A primary function of in-
dependent directors in the future will be to attend to the main job of running the
corporation, producing a dependable and worthwhile product, and making a
profit, while also trying to see that important social and environmental goals are
achieved. Perhaps a crucial function of outside board members is to consider
whether their corporation is lean and hungry or fat. It is worrisome when the
American automobile industry gets in trouble, and workers, management, direc-
tors, and politicians all demand that the industry be protected from foreign auto-
mobile imports. Having failed in their first task-to monitor performance of the
corporation and keep it out of trouble-directors' job should be to restore the
competitiveness of their company. This is a key area for outside director interest.
A great opportunity for the independent director is to provide the board
with vision and to support those elements of management that need to be
strengthened, in order to make American business newly creative and vigorous.
We have in too many economic areas become careful, conservative, dull, over-
regulated and over-constricted. Here is another area where the experience, judg-
ment, and objectivity of outside directors can be useful. Confrontational politics
developed over the last half-century have led to redundant, expensive, and
dampening regulation instead of strong but flexible and economical regulation.
Independent directors, with their broad contact with other segments of the econ-
omy and society, can help their corporations discern those areas in which govern-
ment regulation needs to be "rolled back," strengthened, or amended.
Conclusion
Corporate governance is changing in America, and probably for the better.
It is moving toward great equality, a more effective monitoring of the perform-
ance of individual companies, and more democratic selection and operation of
the board itself. Boards are far better informed than they were a few decades
ago.
But there is so much interest among the public and government in telling
American business how to run itself that the next ten years will see repeated
these words. A welcome exception is Harold M. Williams, former SEC chairman. See H. Williams, Cor-
porate Accountability and Corporate Power (Oct. 24, 1979) (paper presented in the Fairless Lecture Se-
ries, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa.).
38 America's savings rate was only 4.5% in 1979 compared with Japan's 20.1% (1978), Canada's
10.3%, West Germany's 14.6%, France's 17.1%, the United Kingdom's 15.7%, and Pacific Basin countries'
15%. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS 12 (Dec. 1980).
39 By 1976, the Soviet Union, West Germany, France, and Japan all spent a greater percentage of
their gross national product on research than did the United States. TIME, May 3, 1976, at 56.
40 See, e.g., Japan is Here to Stay, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 3, 1979, at 81.
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assaults upon specific elements of that governance. Directors are, and should be,
giving more attention to their role in selecting corporations' goals and directions.
They must achieve a number of sometimes conflicting governance objectives,
such as (1) how to maintain a competitive and innovative company while meet-
ing the outside social demands upon it; (2) how to achieve business goals without
unacceptable damage to the environment, civil rights, competitors, or the general
public; and (3) how to achieve widespread participation in the decisionmaking
process while still maintaining a capacity for decisive action.
We have become so consumed by the process of governance, and the interac-
tion of government and private enterprise, that we are placing substantial barri-
ers in the road of effective corporate management. Americans can no longer
enjoy the luxury of inefficiency, confusion of goals, and multiplicity of regulation.
Our objective in governance must be to retain flexibility, diversity, and creativity
in management, all leading to renewed productivity in an economy gone soft.
Corporate governance is at the center of this reinvigoration. The independent
director has a significant challenge ahead of him in achieving these objectives for
private enterprise in America.
